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Lien-Suiiilies- Work Done.-When supplies are furnished to a
vessel in a foreign port by order of her master a lien is implied, but for
work by 6rder of the owner no lien will be held to exist unless proved by
the agreement of the parties.
MARITIME LIEN FOR REPAIRS AND SUPPLIES TO A SHIP.

When, in the early stages of the
development of our system of maritime law, the question of the existence of a maritime lien for
necessary repairs and supplies to a
ship, came before the courts for
consideration, they rejected the
English law, which held that no
such lien existed, on the ground
that the non-existence of such a
lien in England was due alone to
the lack of jurisdiction of the
courts of admiralty, by reason
of the prohibition of the courts of
common law. The Supreme Court
having previously decided that the
grant of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction in the Constitution was
not a grant o f the limited jurisdiction of the admiralty courts of
England, no similar objection to
the jurisdiction of the Federal
courts could be made, and it was
held, following the civil law, that
one who furnished necessary supplies had a lien upon the ship itself
for his security, which could be enforced by an action in rem: "The
Aurora," I Wheat., 96. It cannot,
IReported in 50 Fed. Rep., 914.

however, be truly said that the
civil law was followed, as our courts
being influenced by the common
law repugnance to secret liens did
not adopt the broad principle of
the implied hypothec of the civil
law, but based the existence of the
maritime lien for supplies upon the
necessity for credit to the ship. As
a ship is constructed for action
rather than inaction, or as has been
said, that "a ship is made to plow
the seas and not to rot by the
walls," the courts were compelled
by the necessities of commerce and
trade to hold that where, in order
to prevent a defeat of that purpose,
credit to the ship was necessary,
that the law would imply that an
hypothecation had been made, i. e.,
that a maritime lien existed.
The theory of the courts that in
cases only of a necessity for credit
to the ship would a maritime lien
exist, greatly affected the subsequent development of the law, and
has created many points of difference from the civil law.
'The first point of difference efDecided June 2, 1892.

AND SUPPLIES TO A SHIP.
fected arose in "The Gen'l Smith,"
4 Wheat., 438 (18ig), where it was
held that if supplies were furnished
to a ship in the port or State to
which she belonged, that the maritime law would imply no lien, and
that nofie existed unless given by
the local municipal law. Under
these circumstances the owner being present, or presumptively pressent, the presumption is that his
personal credit will suffice to obtain
supplies, and the law will not encourage secret liens by implying
one, but will recognize an express
lien by way of bottomry alone.
The tendency at first was to confine these liens within the strictest
limits. Thus, in "The St. Jago dd
Cuba," 9 Wheat., 409 (18 24), JOHNSON, J., said, in delivering the
opinion of the Court: "It is not in
the power of anyone but the shipmaster, not the owner himself, to
give these implied liens upon the
vessel. The law marine attaches the
power of pledging or subjecting the
vessel to material men, to the office
of shipmaster. The necessities of
commerce require that when remote
from the owner he shall be able to
subject the owner's property to
that liability, without which it is
reasonable to believe he will not be
able to pursue his owner's interests.
When the owner is present the
reason ceases, and the contract is
inferred to be with the owner himself, on his own responsibility,
without a view to the vessel."
But the same necessities of conimerce which led the courts to
recognize these liens led to a
modification of the doctrine pronounced in this dictum.
In Thomas v. Osborn, 19 How.,
22 at page 38, TANEY, C. J., says:
' Now, if Leach is to be regarded
as owner for the time when he was

sailing "The Laura" under the
agreement, then by the maritime
law the repairs and supplies furnished at his request are presumed
to have been furnished upon his
personal credit, unless the contrary
afifears."
In 1869 the question came before
the Supreme Court in "The Kalorama," io Wall., 204, and it was
then held that it was no objection
to the assertion in the admiralty of
a maritime lien against a vessel for
necessary repairs made and supplies
furnished to her in a foreign port
that the owner was there and gave
directions in person for them, the
same having been made expressly
on the credit of the vessel. In delivering the opinion of the Court,
CLIFFORD, J., said: "Implied liens,
it is said, can be create d only by the
master, but if it is meant by that
proposition that the owner or
owners, if more than one, cannot
order repairs and supplies on the
credit of the vessel, the Court cannot assent to the proposition, as the
practice is constantly otherwise.
Undoubtedly, the presence of the
owner defeats the implied authority
of the master, but the presence of
the owner would not destroy such
credit as is necessary to furnish
food to the mariners and save the
vessel and cargo from the perils of
the sea."
In "The Guy," i Ben., 112; 9
Wall., 758, it was held that a maritime lien existed for supplies furnished to the owner upon his order,
the Court finding that "there was
an agreement based upon the credit
of the vessel," and that "the responsibility of the boat for the *bill
was a feature in the transaction,
recognized by both parties at the
time of the contracting of the
debt."

MARITIME LIEN FOR REPAIRS
The rule, deducible from these sustained. This is allowed because
cases, is that where the owner is even an owner in a foreign .port
present in a foreign port and supmay be without the means, reputaplies are furnished to a ship,'that
tion or credit, and hence maybe
the presumption is that they are under the same necessity as the
furnished upon his .personal credit,
master for making use of the credit
but the presumption is not a conof the ship. But as I have said, this
clusive one, and may be rebutted
necessity in the case of the owner
by evidence that the personal credit
is not presumed. It must appear in
of the owner in the foreign port is proof, either from the circumstannot sufficient to supply the wants
ces or from the terms of the negoof the ship, and that the credit of tiation, which may afford conclusive
evidence both of the iltent and of
the latter is actually relied upon.
Notwithstanding these decisions,
the necessity. . . . In all the
however, the later cases are not reported decisions where a lien has
been sustained for supplies furharmonious, owing to the use of
certain expressions by the Court in nished by an owner in person .in a
foreign port, the Court has found
"The Kalorama."
In Stevenson v. "The Francis," 21 an intent by both parties that the
Fed. Rep., 715 (1883), it was held ship should be charged, and has
placed the decision directly upon
by BRowN, J. (S. D. of N. Y.), that
that ground."
where a known owner obtaining
supplies on his personal order in a
To the same effect are "The Union
foreign port, not being master ("The Express," i Brown Adm., 537; "The
Mary Bell," i Sawy., 135), that he
Sarah Harris," 7 Ben., 177; "The
Rapid Transit," ii Fed., 329. It is
deals presumptively on his pen.onaf
questionable whether the dictum o
credit only, and no lien will be implied unless the libellant satisfies BROWN, J., in "The Frances," suthe Court, from the negotiations or fira, to the effect that to create a
circumstances, that there was a
maritime lien for supplies furnished
common understanding to bind the in a foreign port, that evidence of
ship.
both necessity of credit to the ship
The Court said: "In a foreign
and a common intent to burden the
port when the o*ner is present and
ship is correct, in view of the reaprocures the supplies in'person, not son laid down for the existence of
being master, in the absence of any such liens. Whether or not the
express reference to the- ship as a parties intend to hypothecate the
source of credit, the sanmie presump- ship is immaterial, as no verbal
tion as to the owner's means and as hypothecation is known to our law,
to his intention exists primafacie; the only species known being by
but this presumption is not conclu- express hypothecation in the nature
sive, as in the home port, and may of bottomry, or the hypothecation
be repelled by proof drawn either which the law implies where from
from the express language of the the circumstances the credit to the
parties or from any other circum- ship is necessary. The intention
stances satisfactorily showing that of the parties is immaterial. The
a credit of the ship was within the question is whether the situation of
common intention, and when this the ship is such that the law will
intention appears the lien will be infer that credit to her was neces-
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sary,which establishes the maritime
lien.
In "The Scotia," 35 Fed. Rep.,
907, BROWIF, J. reached a different
conclusion in reference to supplies
ordered by the master, holding that
the implied lien for supplies furnished to a foreign vessel is created,
where it exists at all, by the maritime law, and not the master's will.
In "The Mary Morgan," 28 Fed.
Rep., x96, the Court seems to have
been of opinion that no impflied lien
exists for supplies furnished to the
owner in a foreign port, and that
only an express lien would be upheld.
The Court said: "The notion of
extending it (implied liens) to debts
contracted to the owner is of recent
origin. The wisdom of so extending it is certainly open to grave
doubt. Why should it be thus extended? The owner being present
may authorize an express lien. He
is hampered by no question of authority. If he is willing to hypothecate his vessel, he can agree to do
so. Such an agreement removes
all room for speculation and uncertainty. If the creditor does not
require this, why allow him to set
up an implied hypothecation, a
pledge to be implied or not, as the
Court may understand and construe
the circumstances." Just what is
meant by an express lien is not
clear, as our law recognizes none
but in the nature of bottomry; but
that is evidently not the sense in
which it is here used, as referenceis
made to the finding of the Court in
"The Kalorama," supra, that the
supplies were furnished in that case

with the express understanding
that they were furnished upon the
credit of the ship, as being consistent with the idea of an express lien.
If the Court meant an express hypothecation of the vessel, the conclusion is certainly questionable, as
even-when there is an express reference to the ship as a source of
credit the lien is not an expressone
but an implied one. The difficulty
seems to originate in the use of the
word "implied " in connection with
theseliens. By our law where credit
to the ship is necessary the law will
hold that there is a maritime lien,
i. e., will imfly that an hypothecation of the vessel has been made.
Under certain circumstances the law
will imply or infer that the credit
of the ship has been relied upon,
and consequently that there is an
implied lien.
In "The George ..-Kemp," 2 Low.,
477, it is held that there may be an
implied or maritime lien for supplies furnished to the owner. To the
same effect see "Maritime Liens,"
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A logical conclusion from the decisions of the Supreme Court would
seem to be that the existence of a
maritime lien in such cases depends
upon whether the circumstances
show a necessity of creditto the ship,
and that the intention of the parties
has no other effect than as a fact
showing that the personal credit of
the owner is not sufficient to supply
the necessities of the vessel.
HORACE L. CHEVNEY.

